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An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control
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RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Friday 30 January 1998 Volume 19 : Issue 58
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Date: Wed, 28 Jan 1998 03:30:35 -0500
From: Vin McLellan <
A draft ("consultation version") of a report by the European Parliament's
Office for Scientific and Technological Option Assessment (STOA) entitled
"AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL CONTROL" has been submitted to
the EuroParl's Civil Liberties and Interior Committee. Several IT-relevant
excerpts are now available at John Young's widely respected crypto-politics
website: <
(STOA regs apparently require a document to be distributed only on paper
while it is a "working document." Quaint, huh? A hardcopy can be ordered by
e-mail from the office of British MEP Glyn Ford <
According to Mr. Young's correspondents, the report covers:
- The Role & Function of Political Control Technologies - Recent Trends and Innovations - Developments in Surveillance Technologies - Innovations in Crowd Control Weapons - New Prison Control Systems - Interrogation, Torture Techniques and Technologies - Regulation of Horizontal Proliferation - Further Research
As expected, a portion of the report highlights the NSA's Echelon surveillance system, developed and managed in conjunction with its sister SigIntel agencies from the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Snippets quoted give the flavor, capturing the tenor of fear common in European media references to the NSA:
"[...] unlike many of the electronic spy systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON is designed for primarily non- military targets: governments, organizations and businesses in virtually every country. The ECHELON system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and then siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like Memex to find key words."
"[...] Within Europe, all e-mail, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency, transferring all target information from the European mainland via the strategic hub of London then by satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North York Moors of the UK."
The priority targets of this surveillance system are selected by the participating intelligence agencies -- only one of which is European -- on the basis of their individual military and political interests, notes STOA. "Whilst there is much information gathered about potential terrorists, there is a lot of economic intelligence, notably intensive monitoring of all the countries participating in the GATT negotiations...."
The report seems to briefly summarize a wealth of earlier reports on the Echelon network, notably from Bamford and Hager, but offers no apparent evidence of an independent inquiry.
The report nevertheless suggests that these intelligence agencies have become a law unto themselves, and operate in a context where most presumably-private communications are effectively transparent and accessible to them. "With no system of accountability, it is difficult to discover what criteria determine who is not a target," the STOA adds in a dry summary.
STOA recommends a new European Parliament study of the "constitutional issues" raised by the American eavesdropping practices, and of the impact of Echelon upon (a) the "constitutional safeguards" of the individual European states, and (b) "the political, cultural and economic autonomy" of EU's nation states.
The report also recommends that the European Parliament should address and explicitly reject "proposals from the United States for making private messages via the global communications network (Internet) accessible to US Intelligence Agencies.
"Nor," warns STOA, "should the Parliament agree to new expensive encryption controls without a wide ranging debate within the EU on the implications of such measures."
The "implications" of these proposed controls over free access to strong cryptography, declares STOA, "encompass the civil and human rights of European citizens and the commercial rights of companies to operate within the law, without unwarranted surveillance by intelligence agencies operating in conjunction with multinational competitors..."
That last phrase -- with its explicit reference to the commercial intelligence which can be gleaned from electronic surveillance (and the value of such data to "multinational" corporations aligned with each of the intelligence agencies cooperating in Echelon) -- lies in the dense gray text of the report like an unlit fuse.
One of the inevitable problems for a nation which fosters both intelligence prowess and commercial prowess is that success in the former can undermine the legitimacy of whatever success it achieves in commerce and industry. International finance and trade rely, in some measure, upon a general acceptance that the terms of such trade are overt, if not necessarily "fair." Without that minimal trust, the successful competitor is viewed not with respect, or even jealousy; but with scorn and bitterness. Commercial failures will inevitably attribute their losses not to the skill or ingenuity of their international competitors, but rather to the competence and bias of the mysterious cyberspooks who, all acknowledge, probably watched the deal unfold.
The MEPs wouldn't be European if they didn't consider the possibility of that sort of frustration fueling a backlash against the European Union and EU governments which appear either unable or unwilling to protect the integrity of their economic infrastructure.
Americans worry about future InfoWar: the corruption of the American economic infrastructure by tech-savvy foreigners. A Presidential Commission studies the threat today, and generates headlines by the ream.
Europeans might fairly ask if they are not already the victims of such malevolent prowess. And what guarantees could they be offered that this is not the case?
"Cryptography is like literacy in the Dark Ages. Infinitely potent, for good and ill... yet basically an intellectual construct, an idea, which by its nature will resist efforts to restrict it to bureaucrats and others who deem only themselves worthy of such Privilege." _ A thinking man's Creed for Crypto/ vbm.
Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <
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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 19.58
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Standard Risks reuse disclaimer:
Reused without explicit authorization under blanket permission granted for all Risks-Forum Digest materials. The author(s), the RISKS moderator, and the ACM have no connection with this reuse.
[The remainder of this file consists of excerpts from the report that have been circulating on the Internet, together with instructions for ordering a copy of the report. Please note that, although I have reason to believe that the excerpts are authentic, I am not completely certain.]
AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL CONTROL Published by Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) Directorate General for Research Luxembourg 6 january 1998 Document nr: PE 166 499
"The document is a working document. The current version is being circulated for consultation. It is not an official publication of STOA or of the European Parliament. The document does not necessarily represent the views of the European Parliament."
"4.4 National & International Communications Interceptions Networks
Modern communications systems are virtually transparent to the advanced interceptions equipment which can be used to listen in. Some systems even lend themselves to a dual role as a national interceptions network. For example the message switching system used on digital exchanges like System X in the UK supports an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) protocol. This allows digital devices. E.g. fax to share the system with existing lines. The ISDN subset is defined in their documents as "Signaling CCITT1-series interface for ISDN access. What is not widely known is that built in to the international CCITT protocol is the ability to take phones 'off hook' and listen to the conversations occurring near the phone, without the user being aware that it is happening. (SGR Newsletter, No.4,1993) This effectively means that a national dial up telephone tapping capacity is built into these systems from the start. (System X has been exported to Russia and China) Similarly, the digital technology required to pinpoint mobile phone users for incoming phone calls, means that all mobile phone users in a country when activated, are mini-tracking devices, giving their owners whereabouts at any time and stored in the company's computer for up to two years. Coupled with System X technology, this is a custom built mobile track, tail and tap system par excellence. (Sunday telegraph, 2.2.97)
Within Europe, all email, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency, transferring all target information from the European mainland via the strategic hub of London then by satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North York Moors of the UK. The system was first uncovered in the 1970's by a group of researchers in the UK (campbell, 1981. The researchers used open sources but where subsequently arrested under Britain's Official Secrets legislation. The 'ABC' trial that followed was a critical turning point in researcher's understanding of both of the technology of political control and how it might be challenged by research on open sources. (See Aubrey, 1981 & Hooper 1987) Other work on what is now known as Signals intelligence was undertaken by researchers such as James Bamford, which uncovered a billion dollar world wide interceptions network, which he nicknamed the 'Puzzle Palace'. A recent work by Nicky Hager, Secret Power, (hager 1996) provider the most comprehensive details to date of a project called ECHELON. Hager interviewed more than 50 people concerned with intelligence to document a global surveillance system that stretches around the world to form a targeting system on all of the key Intelsat satellites used to convey most of the world's satellite phone calls, internet, email, faxes and telexes. These sites are based at Sugar grove and Yakima, in the USA, at Waihopai in New Zealand, at Geraldton in Australia, Hong Kong and Morwenstow in the UK.
The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlike many of the electronic spy systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON is designed for primarily non-military targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every country. The ECHELON system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and then siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like Memex. To find key words. Five nations share the results with the US as the senior partner under the UKUSA agreement of 1948, Britain, New Zealand, and Australia are very much acting as subordinate information sevicers.
Each of the five centres supply "dictionaries" to the other four of keywords, Phrases, people and places to "tag" and the tagged information intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting country. Whilst there is much information gathered about potential terrorists, there is a lot of economic intelligence, notably intensive monitoring of all the countries participating in the GA TT negotiations. But Hager found that by far the main priorities of this system continued to be military and political intelligence applicable to their wider interests. Hager quotes from a "highly placed intelligence operatives" who spoke in the Observer in London. "We feel we can no longer remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross malpractice and negligence within the establishment in which we operate." They gave as examples. GCHQ interception of three charities, including Amnesty International and Christian Aid. "At any time GCHQ is able to home in on their communications for a routine target request," the GCHQ source said. In the case of phone taps the procedure is known as Mantis. With telexes its called Myfly. By keying in a code relating to third world aid, the source was able to demonstrate telex "fixes" on the three organisations. With no system of accountability, it is difficult to discover what criteria determine who is not a target.
In February, the UK based research publication Statewatch reported that the EU had secretly agreed to set up an international telephone tapping network via a secret network of committees established under the "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty covering co-operation on law and order. Key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding signed by EU states in 1995. (ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 25.10.95) which remains classified. According to a Guardian report (25.2.97) it reflects concern among European intelligence agencies that modern technology will prevent them from tapping private communications. "EU countries it says, should agree on "international interception standards set at a level that would ensure encoding or scrambled words can be broken down by government agencies." Official report say that the EU governments agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington. Yet earlier minutes of these meetings suggest that the original initiative cane from Washington. According to Statewatch, network and service providers in the EU will be obliged to install "tappable" systems and to place under surveillance any person or group when served with an interception order. These plans have never been referred to any European government for scrutiny, nor one suspects to the Civil Liberty Committee of the European Parliament, despite the clear civil liberties issues raised by such an unaccountable system. We are told that the USA, Australia, Canada, Norway and Hong Kong are ready to sign up. All these bar Norway are parties to the ECHELON system and it is impossible to determine if there are not other agendas at work here. Nothing is said about finance of this system but a report produced by the German government estimates that the mobile phone part of the package will cost 4 billion D-marks.
Statewatch concludes that "It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its potential development on phone calls combined with the standardization of "tappable communications centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU and the USA which present a truly global threat over which there are no legal or democratic controls" (press release 25.2.97)"
If you are interested in obtaining a free copy of this report, then complete this fax and send it to 32-22-849059
TO: Karin Sercu, STOA Programme Directorate-General for Research, Directorate B, Eastman 112, rue Belliard 97-113, B-1047 Bruxelles, Belgium
Subject: STOA report 'Technologies of Political Control'
FROM: "YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS HERE"
Dear Ms. Sercu,
I'd like to acquire the STOA Report "AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL CONTROL", document number PE 166 499.
Please please send it to:
"YOUR ADDRESS HERE"
Kind regards,
"YOUR NAME HERE" ```
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